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I. OVERVIEW

A. Introduction
Assume two large corporations form a partnership
(“Partnership”) that acquires, for cash, all of the stock of another
corporation (“Target”) that is promptly liquidated after its
acquisition to effectuate Partnership’s ultimate goal of acquiring
Target’s appreciated assets. Might Partnership, citing the KimbellDiamond Doctrine (hereinafter, the “KD Doctrine”), claim that
Target is exempt from paying income tax for the gain that is
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from William Mitchell College of Law in 1995, and his LL.M. (Taxation) from
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and Lisa Joire. The views expressed herein are the author’s alone, and are not
necessarily those of Ernst & Young, LLP.
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otherwise recognized upon a liquidating corporation’s distribution
1
of appreciated property?
Partnership would be invoking a doctrine that, since the
middle of the twentieth century, was an analytical touchstone of
income tax analysis. The doctrine generally held that an acquiring
party (often a corporation) that purchased the stock of Target
could treat its acquisition as though it had directly purchased
Target’s assets, if that was the acquirer’s intent, it otherwise would
have purchased the assets directly, and if Target was promptly
liquidated following the acquisition. However, because of statutory
changes with respect to corporate purchasers, the doctrine was fast
fading from prominence by 1980, when an appellate court held
“definitively and absolutely that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is
2
extinct.” Any remaining doubt about the viability of the doctrine
was ostensibly eliminated in 1982, when Congress, with the
3
enactment of section 338, explicitly stated that such provision was
intended to replace any non-statutory treatment under the KD
4
Doctrine.
As discussed within this Article, though, it is unclear whether
the doctrine was ever completely eliminated. And especially with
respect to non-corporate acquirers such as Partnership, it is
questionable whether the doctrine’s scope has been limited at all,
leaving these taxpayers with strong arguments for claiming
exemption from a gain recognition provision of the Code.
B. The Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine
The KD Doctrine, which has also been referred to as the “asset
acquisition doctrine,” is illustrative of yet another impressive
“doctrine” that informs corporate income tax analysis: the step
5
transaction doctrine. The step transaction doctrine is a recurring
1. All references to “Code” are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (“I.R.C.”).
2. Chrome Plate, Inc. v. Dist. Dir. Of Internal Revenue (In Re Chrome
th
Plate), 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5 Cir. 1980).
3. All references to “section,” unless otherwise noted, are to the applicable
section of the Code.
4. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 97-760, at 536 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
781, 1310.
5. See Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir.
1983) (“The step-transaction doctrine is a corollary of the general tax principle
that the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction rather
than its form.”).
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and fundamental theme permeating the tax law and has been the
subject of numerous articles and commentary, which this Article
6
will not attempt to aggrandize. Suffice to say that, when the step
transaction doctrine applies, a series of formally separate steps will
be consolidated and treated as a single transaction if the steps are,
in substance, integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a
particular result. This “doctrine,” in turn may be viewed as derived
from the principle that the substance of a transaction should
7
triumph over its form and that tax consequences should be based
on the whole of what happened rather than on artificially separated
parts; at least the government (if not the taxpayer) should have the
option of being able to assert substance-over-form analysis when
necessary.
The KD Doctrine takes its name from the holding of Kimbell8
Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, although, as discussed below,
9
the doctrine pre-dated that case. As used throughout this Article,
references to the KD Doctrine will adopt the following definition:
[W]hen stock in a corporation is purchased for the
purpose and with the intent of acquiring its underlying
assets and that purpose continues until the assets are
taken over, no independent significance taxwise attaches
to the several steps of a multiple step transaction. The
final step [the liquidation] is, therefore, viewed not as
independent of the stock purchase but simply as one of
the steps in a unitary transaction, the purchase of
assets . . . . The essence of the doctrine . . . in short, is that
tax significance attaches not to the separate steps after the
first one but to the transaction as a whole, each step in
6. See, e.g., Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter
C, 52 TAX LAW. 457 (1999) (discussing applications of the step transaction
doctrine); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 859 (1982) (discussing the place of doctrine in deciding tax disputes).
7. Or, substance triumphs over empty forms, as articulated by Judge Frank
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Comm’r, 972 F.2d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 1992).
th
8. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff’d per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5 Cir. 1951).
9. It has also been referred to as a “rule” or “principle.” Because “doctrine”
seems to be the prevailing nomenclature during recent decades, this Article will
use such term, without delving into the subject of the difference between a
th
doctrine, rule or principle. See, e.g., In re Chrome Plate, 614 F.2d 990 (5 Cir.
th
1980) (using the term “doctrine”); Griswold v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 427 (5 Cir.
th
1968) (using the term “rule”); United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9 Cir.
1959) (using the term “rule”); Estate of Suter v. Comm’r, 29 T.C. 244 (1957)
(using the term “principle”); Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (using the term
“doctrine”).
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which is viewed as an integral part of a single transaction,
10
the purchase of assets.
The KD Doctrine is focused solely upon the transaction from
the purchaser’s perspective, does not offer to account for the
11
seller’s treatment of the transaction, and represents an instance
where the federal income tax consequences accorded an overall
transaction do not strictly follow the transaction’s “form.” This may
well reflect a judicial reluctance to place too heavy a premium
12
upon strictly following form. However, this is an area of tension,
as much of federal income tax practice is form-driven, and
13
corporate income tax practice is no exception.
This tension between form and substance is illustrated by the
following example.
Building upon the example introduced
previously, assume that Partnership paid $1,000,000 for the stock of
14
Target. The “form” of the transaction is comprised of two steps: a
purchase of stock and a liquidation of the purchased corporation.
The tax consequences attending the form are that Partnership has
a basis of $1,000,000 in the stock of Target, as determined under
15
section 1012. Assume as well that Target’s aggregate asset basis is
$500,000 (Target’s “inside asset basis”) with a fair market value of
$1,000,000 (assuming no consideration of the inherent tax
16
liability). Thus, when Partnership, as Target’s sole shareholder,
causes Target to dissolve under applicable state law, section 336
would require that corporate-level gain be recognized upon the
17
distribution of property in complete liquidation. Assuming the
assets are properly valued at $1,000,000, Target thus has $500,000
of recognized gain, and, at a thirty-five percent effective tax rate, a
th

10. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 163 (5 Cir. 1959).
11. See infra note 224 and related text.
12. But see Comm’r v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932) (criticizing
judicial recourse, in certain taxation issues, to such “vague alternatives as ‘form’
and ‘substance,’ anodynes for the pains of reasoning”).
13. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 457.
14. For purposes of simplicity, also assume that Target has no liabilities.
15. I.R.C. § 1012 (1986).
16. As the example illustrates, it is a mistake to assume that “inside” asset
value equals “outside” stock value where the inside assets are appreciated and one
cannot directly hold the assets without the incidence of taxation. See BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
th
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 10.41[4] (7 ed. 2000) [hereinafter BITTKER & EUSTICE].
17. I.R.C. § 336(a) (2001). (“Except as otherwise provided in this section or
section 337, gain or loss shall be recognized to a liquidating corporation on the
distribution of property in complete liquidation as if such property were sold to
the distributee at its fair market value.”).
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federal income tax liability of $175,000, which Partnership has
effectively inherited.
But Partnership always intended to acquire Target’s assets and
promptly liquidated Target to effect that objective, since it could
not directly purchase the assets from Target. Indeed, had
Partnership instead negotiated a direct asset purchase, it would
have a $1,000,000 basis in the acquired assets and would not have
inherited a $175,000 tax liability. Given Partnership’s ultimate aim,
the application of the step transaction doctrine and the KD
Doctrine would collapse the intervening step by which, for a
moment, Target is a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation, and
instead view the transaction as though Partnership paid $1,000,000
to Target’s seller in exchange for Target assets. This shortens a
two-step acquisition into a one-step acquisition, at least from
Partnership’s perspective. As such, the liquidation provisions of
the Code would play no role in determining the federal income tax
consequences to Partnership. Instead, Partnership would take a
basis in the assets of $1,000,000, as determined under section 1012.
The discussion in Part II traces the development of the KD
Doctrine in an era where corporate liquidations generally had less
18
federal income tax consequences than they do now.
Part III
considers what relevance the KD Doctrine has now, where
corporate liquidations may have considerably greater tax
19
consequences.
As the following discussion illustrates, the KD
Doctrine has developed along two major tracks: the predominant
one involving corporate purchasers and referred to hereinafter as
the “Corporate KD Doctrine,” and the less predominant
manifestation of the KD Doctrine involving non-corporate
purchasers, referred to hereinafter as the “Non-corporate KD
Doctrine.” Since much (if not all) of the Corporate KD Doctrine
has been replaced by section 338 and the regulations thereunder,
most of the focus of this Article is upon the Non-corporate KD
Doctrine.

18.
19.

See infra, Part II.
See infra Part III.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Corporate Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine
1. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co.
Curiously, the case of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v.
Commissioner was not the first to establish what became known as
20
However, its facts are sufficiently illustrative
the KD Doctrine.
and, thus, are recited below.
A mill property of the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company was
21
destroyed by fire in August of 1942. Upon receipt of insurance
proceeds, the company negotiated the purchase of another nearby
milling property operating in corporate form, the Whaley Mill &
22
Elevator Company (“Whaley”). The board of directors of KimbellDiamond issued a resolution stating that, as soon as practicable
after the purchase of the stock of Whaley, “all necessary steps be
taken to completely liquidate the said corporation by transferring
its entire assets, particularly its mill and milling equipment, to
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company in cancellation and
redemption of the entire issued and outstanding capital stock of
23
Whaley Mill & Elevator Company . . . .”
Consistent with this
declaration, the stock of Whaley was acquired on December 26,
24
1942 for $210,000. Three days later, a plan of liquidation was
entered into by Whaley and Kimbell-Diamond, which provided
that, among other things, the stock was being acquired primarily
for the purpose of enabling the Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Company to obtain direct possession and ownership of the flour
mill and milling plant assets owned by Whaley, and that the parties
agreed that said assets would be conveyed to Kimbell-Diamond by
Whaley in complete liquidation of Whaley, thus canceling the
25
shares of Whaley held by Kimbell-Diamond. The liquidation was
formally completed on December 31, 1942, less than a week after

20. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
21. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74, 75 (1950).
22. Id. at 75-76.
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id. The $210,000 was comprised of $118,200.16 in insurance proceeds to
cover the destroyed assets as well as additional funds of $91,799.84. Id.
25. Id. at 76-77.
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26

the stock acquisition.
Consistent with the form of the transaction, Kimbell-Diamond,
the purchasing corporation, treated the transaction as comprised
of two independent steps: a stock purchase and a liquidation of a
wholly-owned subsidiary. The tax law provided then (much as it
does now under section 332) that a corporate shareholder would
recognize no gain or loss upon the receipt of property in complete
27
liquidation of another corporation and would take a carryover
28
basis in property received from a liquidating corporation. Since
the aggregate adjusted basis of the depreciable Whaley assets (in
the hands of Whaley) was approximately $139,522, KimbellDiamond used this amount as its basis in the assets upon the
liquidation of Whaley.
Although initially unchallenged, the Service later amended its
29
position with respect to depreciable asset basis. The deficiency
notice issued by the Service to Kimbell-Diamond asserted that the
milling company took too high a basis in the Whaley assets (and
correspondingly larger-than-warranted depreciation deductions,
among other items,) and thus owed additional income tax,
declared value excess profits tax, and excess profits tax for the
30
taxable years ending 1945 and 1946. The government asserted a
basis in the depreciable Whaley assets of approximately $110,722.
It arrived at this amount by using Kimbell-Diamond’s adjusted basis
in the destroyed assets, $18,921.90, and adding to that amount the
difference between the total amount expended in acquiring

26. Id. at 77.
27. I.R.C. § 112(b)(6) (1939). Cf. I.R.C. § 332(a) (CCH 2001).
28. I.R.C. § 113(a)(15) (1939). This provision, as amended, shares many
similarities with current section 334(b), which generally provides for a carryover
basis upon property received in complete liquidation of a subsidiary (generally, a
corporation in which the parent corporation owns at least eighty percent of the
stock of the subsidiary). See I.R.C. § 334(b) (2001).
29. The government initially challenged Kimbell-Diamond’s treatment of the
acquired assets as qualifying as tax-free under the involuntary conversion provision
in existence at that time, although it lost on this score. In this first round of
litigation, the government also sought to challenge the basis given the assets by
Kimbell-Diamond, but the Tax Court declined to address the issue then because of
an undeveloped evidence record. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 10
T.C. 7 (1948).
30. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff’d by, 187
F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). The declared value excess profits tax and the excess
profits tax were wartime revenue-raising mechanisms which have since been
repealed. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, § 1, 68A Stat. 5 (superseding Internal
Revenue Service Code of 1939 by Internal Revenue Service Code of 1954).
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Whaley ($210,000) less the amount received from the insurance
company ($118,200.16), or $91,799.84 ($18,921.90 + $91,799.84 =
$110,721.74). The government asserted that Kimbell-Diamond
really acquired assets, and not stock, from Whaley.
Kimbell-Diamond asserted that the transaction’s form should
be respected and that it had received the Whaley assets in
liquidation of another corporation and thus was entitled to the
higher carryover basis in the assets. The Tax Court cited the
familiar refrain that “the incidence of taxation depends upon the
31
substance of a transaction.”
The court stated that this issue
should be governed by the principles of Commissioner v. Ashland Oil
32
& Refining Co. In Ashland Oil & Refining Co., the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a Board of Tax Appeals decision holding
that a corporate purchaser was entitled to a stepped-up basis in the
33
assets of a liquidated corporation that it had purchased. Although
the purchasers in Ashland had held on to their stock for nearly a
year, the Ashland court stated “transitory ownership of stock is not
34
necessarily of legal significance.” Thus, the Kimbell-Diamond court
held that “the purchase of Whaley’s stock and its subsequent
liquidation must be considered as one transaction, namely, the
35
purchase of Whaley’s assets which was petitioner’s sole intention.”
Here, what later became known as the KD Doctrine was applied to
the eponymous milling company to reduce its basis in acquired
assets, thus representing a victory for the government, which was
36
upheld on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
2. Other Illustrative Rulings
As noted, the holding in Kimbell-Diamond was not without
precedent. For example, in Kimbell-Diamond the Tax Court cited
Ashland Oil & Refining Co., a case that was decided twelve years
31. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. at 80 (citing Comm’r v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)).
32. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939)).
33. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d at 593.
34. Id. at 591.
35. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. at 80.
th
36. 187 F.2d 718, 718 (5 Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
Perhaps the reason “Kimbell-Diamond rule” became the phrase describing the
treatment accorded a stock purchase and liquidation was because it represented a
government victory and the government’s subsequent use of the phrase. See M. L.
Cross, Annotation, Income tax: Corporate Assets As Received In Liquidation Or By
Purchase Where Stock Is Purchased To Acquire Assets, 83 A.L.R.2d 718, 721 n.3 (1962).
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37

earlier. In Ashland, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was called
upon to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, which had
concluded that a purchasing corporation was entitled to a steppedup basis in the assets of an acquired corporation that it had
38
The government argued on appeal that the
liquidated.
liquidation was to be accorded independent significance, in that
the purchasing corporation owned the stock for nearly a year
(while the stock was formally held by an escrow agent) and had
included the target corporation’s income in its own consolidated
39
return in 1925. The Sixth Circuit framed the issue:
[W]hether if the entire transaction, whatever its form, was
essentially in intent, purpose and result, a purchase by
Swiss [the purchasing corporation] of property, its several
steps may be treated separately and each be given an
effect for tax purposes as though each constituted a
distinct transaction. It is true that Swiss acquired all of the
stock of Union [the target corporation]. But this is not
decisive, for a transitory ownership of stock is not
necessarily of legal significance. It has been said too often
to warrant citation that taxation is an intensely practical
matter, and that the substance of the thing done and not
40
the form it took must govern.
“It seems clear,” the court concluded, that the transaction,
although formally structured as a stock purchase and liquidation,
was in substance a purchase of the assets belonging to the target
41
corporation, since they could not otherwise be acquired.
Many other cases, both prior to and following the celebrated
42
Kimbell-Diamond case, adopted the KD Doctrine, and the Service
eventually acquiesced where the Service had been arguing against
43
its application.
37. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588.
38. Id. at 590.
39. Id. at 590-91.
40. Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
41. Id.
th
42. See, e.g., United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 717 (5 Cir. 1960);
th
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 162-63 (5 Cir. 1959); Prairie
th
Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309, 311 (10 Cir. 1933); N. Am. Serv. Co. v.
Comm’r, 33 T.C. 677, 692 (1960); Mills v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 150, 154-55 (1958);
Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 408, 414-15 (1955); Koppers Coal
Co. v. Comm’r, 6 T.C. 1209, 1218 (1946); Spang, Chalfant & Co., Inc. v. Comm’r,
31 B.T.A. 721, 723 (1934); Warner Co. v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 1225, 1228 (1932).
43. See, e.g., Suter v. Comm’r, 29 T.C. 244 (1957), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 8; and
Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 25 T.C. at 414.
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3. Section 334(b)(2) of the 1954 Code
a. Enactment of Section 334(b)(2)
Application of the KD Doctrine was based upon an analysis of
the intent of the purchaser: i.e., whether the purchaser intended to
44
acquire a target corporation’s assets all along. Such a standard, of
course, involves significant subjectivity. In an attempt to bring
more objectivity and certainty to the tax treatment of stock
45
purchases followed by liquidations, the House of Representatives,
in 1954, proposed a new provision in the tax code by which “the
46
As
principle of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. . . . is effectuated.”
explained by the House report, it provided that “a shareholder will
in general be permitted to receive the purchase price for his stock
as his basis for the assets distributed to him in liquidation
47
irrespective of the assets’ cost to the corporation.” The Senate,
while agreeing that such language would effectuate the principle of
Kimbell-Diamond, cut back on the statutory language proposed in
the House, noting that since the application of the KD Doctrine “is
primarily in the area of liquidations by a parent corporation of its
subsidiary, the rule has been limited . . . to liquidations of this
48
type.” Thus, 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) as enacted generally
provided an exception to carryover basis treatment for property
received by a parent acquiring corporation from a subsidiary in
49
“complete liquidation.”
The exception provided that, under
certain conditions, a corporation liquidating a recently purchased
subsidiary may use the cost of the purchased stock (adjusted by
regulations) as the basis of the acquired assets, if at least eighty
percent of the target corporation stock was acquired by purchase

44. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling. Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74, 80 (1950).
45. See Michael W. Dolan, Kimbell-Diamond, Chrome Plate, and Taxpayer Intent in
the Liquidation of Subsidiaries: Should Congress Reexamine Section 334(b)(2)?, 8 J. CORP.
TAX’N 281, 286-87 (1982) (citing American Law Institute’s draft “Federal Income
Tax Statute” that noted the uncertainty in the application of the rule of KimbellDiamond, and suggested that all liquidations be eligible for a basis marked by
either the cost of the assets or the cost of the stock).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4063.
47. Id.
48. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 48 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
4679.
49. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1982 & 1988) (original at Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 104 (1954)).
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50

b. Treatment of the Liquidation: Pittsburgh Realty
The remedy provided by 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) did not
ignore the liquidation event, as was often the case in the
application of the KD Doctrine, but simply provided a different
mechanism for determining the basis in assets acquired pursuant to
such liquidation. This point was illustrated well in 1976 when the
Tax Court decided a case that involved many “typical” Kimbell51
Diamond facts. In Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust v. Commissioner,
a realty trust that qualified as a “real estate investment trust”
52
(“REIT”) under section 856, sought to acquire certain real estate
53
assets of a target corporation. Although the initial negotiations
conducted by representatives of the trust with the sellers were with
a view toward the direct purchase of the assets, the seller later
insisted, upon advice of counsel, that the transaction take the form
of a stock sale; they believed this structure would avoid the
54
imposition of state real estate transfer taxes. On the purchasing
side, however, representatives of the trust were concerned about
the effect such a sale structure would have upon the trust’s
55
continued qualification as a REIT.
The acquiring trust thus
applied for a private ruling from the Service that the trust’s
qualification as a REIT would not be adversely affected by the
acquisition of the target corporation, which would “be immediately
followed by the liquidation of . . . [the target] pursuant to Section
56
332 . . . .” An additional ruling requested was that, pursuant to

50. See, e.g., Broadview Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 714
th
(7 Cir. 1977) (explaining stock was not acquired by purchase since it was
acquired from a related party; purchaser ineligible for 1954 Code section
334(b)(2) treatment).
51. 67 T.C. 260 (1976).
52. A REIT is defined to mean a “corporation, trust or association” that,
among other things, would otherwise be taxable as a domestic corporation. See
I.R.C. § 856(a), (a)(3) (West Supp. 2001).
53. Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust, 67 T.C. at 263.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 266. Under the rules in place at that time, at the end of each
quarter, not more than twenty-five percent of a REIT’s total assets could be
represented by securities. Apparently, the value of the stock of the target
corporation (which would be considered “securities” for this purpose) would be
large enough such that the trust’s securities holdings would be in excess of twentyfive percent of its total assets. See generally I.R.C. § 856(c)(4) (West Supp. 2001).
56. Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust, 67 T.C. at 266.
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section 336 of the 1954 Code, “no gain or loss will result to the
subsidiary . . . upon the disposition of its assets in complete
57
liquidation.”
The Service issued a ruling that essentially granted the trust’s
58
request as to its REIT qualification. One of the additional rulings
stated that “[p]ursuant to section 336 of the Code, no gain or loss
will be recognized to [the target corporation] upon the
distribution of its property to [the trust] (except as provided in sections
59
47, 453(d), 1245 and 1250 of the Code).”
In addition, another
ruling stated that “[p]ursuant to section 334(b)(2), the basis of the
property of [the target corporation] received by [the trust] will be
the adjusted basis of the shares of [the target corporation]
60
Common with respect to which the distribution is made.” Around
61
this time, the target corporation was liquidated as planned.
In litigation, the government asserted that the acquiring trust
was the transferee of the target corporation and that the target
corporation was liable for depreciation recapture gains from the
disposition of depreciable property under section 1245 and on
62
depreciable real property under section 1250. The acquiring trust
did not challenge the existence of the tax liability, but claimed it
could not be called upon to pay the liability, apparently believing
the income tax liability should be borne by the selling
63
shareholders. The trust asserted that, under the KD Doctrine, the
64
substance of the transaction was a purchase of assets. The court
disagreed, stating that the taxpayer’s attempt to re-characterize the
transaction was precluded by the Danielson rule, the law of the
65
circuit to which an appeal would be taken.
Thus, absent a
showing of fraud, mistake, or the like, the taxpayer was bound by
66
the form of the transaction it had chosen. Moreover, the court
57. Id. at 267.
58. Id. at 268.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 269.
62. Id. at 271.
63. Id. at 269.
64. Id. at 273-74.
65. Comm’r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (explaining that a
party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement as construed by the
Service only by adducing proof which in an action between the parties to the
agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or to show its
unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.).
66. Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust, 67 T.C. at 274.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/8

12

Bakke: Dusting off Kimbell-Diamond: The Continued Viability of the Asset
04_BAKKE

2002]

4/18/2002 5:00 PM

DUSTING OFF KIMBALL-DIAMOND DOCTRINE

1455

stated that neither Kimbell-Diamond nor its statutory counterpart
(section 334(b)(2)) “warrants re-characterization of the transaction
for other than basis purposes. Quite simply, the fact that the
transaction may be viewed in the basis context as a single-step asset
purchase in no way vitiates the transfer element for purposes of
67
section 6901 [the transferee liability provision].” The court noted
that the section 334(b)(2) exception does not dispense with the
68
fact that a liquidation has taken place.
c. Scope of Section 334(b)(2)
Pittsburgh Realty illustrates one reason why section 334(b)(2) of
the 1954 Code was not as popular with taxpayers as the original KD
Doctrine. While former section 334(b)(2) generally provided a
basis step-up in the target corporation assets equal to the cost of the
stock, it did so in the context of a liquidation that was otherwise
given effect for federal income tax purposes; and, as such, the
depreciation recapture rules would override the general non69
recognition rules of former section 336.
To be sure, former
section 334(b)(2) represented a more mechanical, and objective,
means of obtaining a stepped-up basis in a purchased corporation’s
70
assets, rather than relying on such vagaries as intent. However,
courts and practitioners disagreed on whether it was the exclusive
means for a corporate purchaser to obtain a stepped-up basis in a
purchased corporation’s assets or whether the KD Doctrine
71
continued to remain viable in some contexts.
Would, for example, the KD Doctrine apply if a corporate
purchaser took more than twelve months to complete its qualifying
72
purchase? In American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, the
purchaser took fourteen months to effect its acquisition of the
73
Although not specifically applying the KD
target corporation.
Doctrine (it returned the case to the trial commissioner,) the Court
of Claims stated that 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) was a safe
67. Id. at 276.
68. Id. (citing Cabax Mills v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 401, 409 (1972)).
69. See I.R.C. § 336 (1954).
70. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (Jul. 28, 1992) (stating section 334(b)(2)
of the 1954 Code improved upon the KD Doctrine “because it provided
predictable results”).
71. See Dolan, supra note 45, at 289 (discussing the reactions to the enactment
of 334(b)(2)).
72. 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
73. Id. at 197.
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harbor provision, and not a preemption of the KD Doctrine.
According to the Court of Claims, “the principle of section
334(b)(2) is derived from the broader, more general rule of KimbellDiamond,” and it is a precise, narrow and objective application of
75
Reviewing the legislative history of the
the broader doctrine.”
provision, the Court of Claims also reasoned that:
[W]e cannot conclude that Congress intended to
differentiate between corporate and individual taxpayers
and permit the use of the judicial Kimbell-Diamond
doctrine by an individual who has acquired stock during a
period in excess of twelve months, and to deny its
application to a corporate taxpayer under the same
76
circumstances.
Other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
1980, entertained less doubt on the matter. “[W]e hold definitively
and absolutely that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is extinct under
77
the 1954 code regarding corporate taxpayers.”
4. Preemption/Codification in Section 338
The operation of former section 334(b)(2) was unsatisfactory
in many respects. For example, it mandated the liquidation of the
78
purchased corporation to qualify for the asset basis step-up. It
provided a series of complex adjustments, which were subject to
manipulation, for the period between a purchase and a
79
liquidation.
In part to combat the complexity of section
334(b)(2), Congress repealed it in 1982 and enacted a new
provision “intended to replace any non-statutory treatment of a

74. Id. at 198.
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id.
77. In re Chrome Plate, Inc., 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980); see also
Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1977)
(reversing the district court, the court found that Congress preempted the
application of the KD Doctrine to corporate purchasers in the enactment of
former section 334(b)(2)).
78. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954); see N.Y. Fruit Auction Corp. v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.
564, 569-70 (1982) (stating neither former section 334(b)(2) nor the KD Doctrine
is applicable where purchasing corporation merged downstream into acquired
target corporation).
79. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 11.45 (4th ed. 1979) (discussing the KD
Doctrine, section 334(b)(2) and the adoption of section 338).
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stock purchase as an asset purchase under the Kimbell-Diamond
80
doctrine.”
Section 338 is similar to former section 334(b)(2) in that it
provides a means for a purchasing corporation to obtain a step-up
in the basis of target corporation’s assets when the target
corporation is acquired pursuant to a qualifying purchase. Unlike
former section 334(b)(2), however, the mechanism provided
under section 338 is elective at the option of the purchaser, or is
made jointly by the purchasing corporation and the seller in
81
certain qualifying transactions.
Under section 338, a target corporation must be acquired in a
“qualified stock purchase,” which generally means the acquisition
of at least eighty percent of the outstanding stock of the target
82
corporation in a purchase transaction. Only a corporation can
make a qualified stock purchase; other non-corporate purchasers
83
are ineligible. A purchasing corporation generally has up to nineand-a-half months to elect stepped-up basis treatment for the target
84
If it makes the
corporation’s assets, following its acquisition.
election, a “new” target corporation is deemed to purchase all the
target corporation assets from an unrelated party. The “old” target
corporation is deemed to sell all of its assets to an unrelated buyer.
The cost of this step up, of course, is tax on the deemed sale, which

80. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-760, at 536 (1982).
81. I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (CCH 2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1 (as
amended in 2001).
82. A qualified stock purchase means any transaction or series of transactions
in which stock (meeting the requirements of section 1504(a)(2)) of one
corporation is acquired by another corporation by purchase during the twelvemonth acquisition period. I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (CCH 2001). A purchase:
[M]eans any acquisition of stock, but only if (i) the basis of the stock in
the hands of the purchasing corporation is not determined (I) in whole
or in part by reference to the adjusted basis of such stock in the hands of
the person from whom acquired, or (II) under section 1014(a) (relating
to property acquired from a decedent), (ii) the stock is not acquired in
an exchange to which section 351, 354, 355, or 356 applies and is not
acquired in any other transaction described in regulations in which the
transferor does not recognize the entire amount of the gain or loss
realized on the transaction, and (iii) the stock is not acquired from a
person the ownership of whose stock would, under section 318(a) (other
than paragraph (4) thereof), be attributed to the person acquiring such
stock.
I.R.C. § 338(h)(3) (CCH 2001). In short, a purchase generally entails an
acquisition of stock from an unrelated person in a taxable transaction. Id.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(b)(1) (2001).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-2(d) (2001).
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the buyer generally inherits when it acquires the target
85
corporation. However, the availability of the election does not
hinge upon the liquidation of the target corporation; the
purchasing corporation may decide to keep the target corporation
86
in existence indefinitely.
5. Revenue Ruling 90-95
87

In 1990, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 90-95, which
squarely addressed the corporate KD Doctrine. Revenue Ruling 9095 addresses two different factual situations. In the first situation,
the Service ruled that if an acquiring corporation organizes a
subsidiary solely for the purpose of acquiring the stock of a target
88
corporation in a reverse subsidiary cash merger, the acquiring
corporation is treated as having acquired the stock of the target in
a qualified stock purchase under section 338 of the Code.
The other factual situation involves a classic Kimbell-Diamond
transaction, in which an acquiring corporation acquires all of the
stock of a target corporation (again, by means of a reverse cash
merger as in the first situation) and immediately liquidates the
target corporation as part of an integrated plan to acquire the
target corporation’s assets, which was partly motivated by a state law
that prohibited the acquiring corporation from owning the stock of
89
the target corporation.
Addressing this second factual situation, the Service held that
the acquiring corporation is treated as having acquired the stock in
a qualified stock purchase under section 338, rather than having

85. This is generally true for a “regular” section 338(g) election. However,
when the purchasing corporation makes a joint election under section 338(h)(10)
with the selling consolidated group, selling affiliate, or S corporation
shareholders, the deemed sale tax consequences are generally borne by the sellers.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-10(a) (2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(3) (2001).
86. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(c) (2001) (discussing the effect of postacquisition events).
87. Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (1990).
88. A reverse subsidiary cash merger is a means by which one corporation can
acquire another corporation in a taxable transaction. Typically, it involves the
formation of a wholly-owned subsidiary, which then merges into the target
corporation, with the target corporation surviving and the target corporation
shareholders receiving consideration comprised exclusively or mostly of cash or
something other than stock. The merger subsidiary’s life is brief and it is often
treated as transitory for federal income tax purposes, as it was in Revenue Ruling
90-95. Id.
89. Id.
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made an acquisition of assets pursuant to the KD Doctrine. The
Service states that, under section 338, asset purchase treatment
turns on whether a section 338 election is made (or is deemed
made) following a qualified stock purchase of target stock and not
on whether the target’s assets are acquired through a prompt
liquidation of the target. The ruling does not address non91
corporate purchasers.
Revenue Ruling 90-95 is therefore consistent with Congress’
intent to afford wide discretion to corporations to either make a
section 338(g) election and obtain a cost basis in a target’s assets or
not make a section 338(g) election and obtain a carryover basis in
92
target’s assets. In this context, however, intent to obtain a cost
basis may only be manifested through an election under section
338.
6. Revenue Ruling 2001-46
Revenue Ruling 2001-46 recently distinguished Revenue
93
Ruling 90-95. In Revenue Ruling 2001-46, the Service again
presented two factual situations. In the first situation, pursuant to
an integrated plan, an acquiring corporation acquires all of the
stock of a target corporation in a statutory merger of a newly
formed merger subsidiary of the acquiring corporation into the
94
target corporation (the “Acquisition Merger”). The shareholders
of target exchange their target stock for a consideration mix of
seventy percent acquiring corporation voting stock and thirty
95
percent cash. As part of the same plan, target merges upstream
into the acquiring corporation in a statutory merger (the
96
“Upstream Merger.”)
The ruling assumes that, absent some prohibition against
application of the step transaction doctrine, the Acquisition Merger
and Upstream Merger would be treated as a single integrated
acquisition by the acquiring corporation of all of the target
corporation assets, as though the target corporation merged
directly into the acquiring corporation. Thus, the Acquisition
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 1 (Sept. 24, 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Merger is effectively ignored, and the two steps are treated as a
single statutory merger of the target corporation into the acquiring
corporation in a transaction that qualifies as a reorganization
under section 368(a)(1)(A).
This approach is similar to that taken in Revenue Ruling 67274, where the acquiring corporation acquires all of the stock of
the target corporation solely in exchange for acquiring corporation
voting stock and, thereafter, target corporation completely
97
liquidates into acquiring corporation.
That ruling holds that
because the two steps are parts of a plan of reorganization, they
98
cannot be considered independently of each other. Thus, the
steps do not qualify as a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B)
followed by a liquidation under section 332, but instead qualify as a
single acquisition of the target’s assets in a reorganization under
99
section 368(a)(1)(C).
Thus, Revenue Ruling 2001-46 distinguishes the second
100
Despite the fact that the
situation of Revenue Ruling 90-95.
Acquisition Merger, standing alone, would otherwise be treated as a
qualified stock purchase under section 338(d)(3), Revenue Ruling
2001-46 holds that, given the effect of the second step (the
Upstream Merger) and the fact that the acquiring corporation
would have a carryover basis in the target corporation assets when
the two steps are integrated, “a section 338 election may not be
101
made in such a situation.”
The Service explains that Revenue Ruling 90-95 rejects the
approach reflected in Revenue Ruling 67-274 where the application
of that approach would treat the purchase of a target corporation’s
stock without a Section 338 election, followed by the liquidation or
merger of the target corporation, as the purchase of the target
corporation’s assets resulting in a cost basis in the assets under
102
Section 1012. According to the Service, such an approach would
be contrary to congressional intent that Section 338 “replaces any
nonstatutory treatment of a stock purchase as an asset purchase
103
under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.”
97. See Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141 (1967) (defining corporate
reorganization).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 1 (Sept. 24, 2001).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/8

18

Bakke: Dusting off Kimbell-Diamond: The Continued Viability of the Asset
04_BAKKE

4/18/2002 5:00 PM

2002]

DUSTING OFF KIMBALL-DIAMOND DOCTRINE

1461

In contrast, according to the Service, the policy underlying
section 338 is not violated by treating the first situation of Rev. Rul.
2001-46 as a single statutory merger of the target corporation into
the acquiring corporation, because such treatment results in a
transaction that qualifies as a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(A) in which the acquiring corporation acquires the
assets of the target corporation with a carryover basis under section
362 and does not result in a cost basis for those assets under
104
Section 1012.
B. The Non-corporate Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine
The enactment of 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) and the
subsequent enactment of section 338 have served to heighten the
distinction between corporate purchasers and non-corporate
purchasers in the application of the KD Doctrine. Unlike
corporate purchasers, the KD Doctrine as applied to non-corporate
purchasers was never the subject of explicit statutory focus.
1. Cullen
One of the first cases to affirm the KD Doctrine’s application
to individuals was Cullen v. Commissioner, decided by the Tax Court
105
In Cullen, Mr. Cullen held
in the same year as Kimbell-Diamond.
twenty-five percent of the stock of a corporation that bore his name
and which was engaged in the business of manufacturing and
106
selling orthopedic appliances.
He acquired the remaining
seventy-five percent of the shares by buying out the other
shareholders and liquidated the corporation on the same day in
107
which he acquired all of the remaining shares.
Mr. Cullen claimed a short-term capital loss with respect to the
liquidation of the seventy-five percent interest that had been
acquired through the buyout, based upon the book value of the
108
distributed tangible assets.
The Tax Court held that loss
treatment was not warranted, concluding that the taxpayer had,
after liquidation of the corporation, everything he paid for when

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
14 T.C. 368 (1950), acq. 1950-2 C.B. 1.
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 371.
Id.
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109

he bought all the corporation’s stock. Citing Kimbell-Diamond, the
Tax Court noted that the taxpayer’s purpose “was not to buy the
stock as such . . . [but rather] to liquidate the corporation so that
he could operate the business as a sole proprietorship. The several
steps employed in carrying out that purpose must be regarded as a
110
single transaction for tax purposes.”
Thus, Mr. Cullen was
treated as purchasing seventy-five percent of the corporation’s
assets directly, rather than receiving them as a result of a
liquidating distribution. In contrast, the Tax Court sustained a
determination that liquidating proceeds received with respect to
the twenty-five percent “old and cold” interest should be treated as
111
long-term capital gain arising from the exchange of stock.
The court did not challenge the valuation of the tangible
assets ascribed by Mr. Cullen, but rather treated the assets (at least
112
seventy-five percent of them) as acquired directly.
Thus, Mr.
Cullen got what he paid for, and did not suffer a loss as to seventyfive percent of the assets. The court thus apparently adopted a
bifurcated view of the liquidation, in which it was respected as to
the “old and cold” twenty-five percent interest, but disregarded as
to the remaining interest.
2. Snively
Three years after Cullen, the Tax Court spoke approvingly of
the application of the KD Doctrine to a situation where an
individual taxpayer purchased all of the stock of a corporation and
caused the corporation to liquidate within six months of the
purchase, where the individual’s “intention right along was to
113
dissolve” the target corporation.
The Tax Court rejected the
government’s contention that the separate existence of the
corporation for a six-month period should be respected
(apparently the purchase and liquidation occurred within the same
taxable year as the individual taxpayer) and instead treated the
114
transaction as a unified asset acquisition.
109. Id. at 372-73.
110. Id. at 373 (citing Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74
(1950)).
111. Id. at 373. The Tax Court disallowed the IRS’s attempt, however, to
increase the amount of capital gain by attempting to add intangible assets to the
proceeds received by the taxpayer. Id.
112. Id.
113. Snively v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 850, 859 (1953), acq. 1956-2 C.B. 8.
114. Id. at 858.
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115

The case of Snively v. Commissioner involved the purchase by
the individual taxpayer of all of the stock of Meloso, a corporation
116
The individual
which owned and operated a citrus grove.
taxpayer, Mr. Snively, was advised by his attorney and accountant to
117
liquidate the corporation upon its purchase. The stock of Meloso
118
was delivered by the seller to an escrow agent in July of 1943.
The agent, which was also a bank, held the certificates as collateral
for a loan, which was repaid in October 1943, at which time Mr.
119
Snively received the stock certificates.
Although the liquidation
of the Meloso stock was originally intended to take place in July,
120
1943, it was not formally dissolved until December 31, 1943. One
of the issues before the Tax Court was whether income earned
during the fall of 1943 should have been reported on Mr. Snively’s
121
return or the corporation’s. The Tax Court held that the income
earned during this period belonged to the corporation. While the
court agreed with Mr. Snively that he should be treated as directly
acquiring the assets of Meloso, the court disagreed with his
assertion that such treatment effectively prevented Meloso from
earning, receiving or being taxed on income following the date of
122
the stock purchase in July, 1943. The court stated:
The stock purchase coupled with the intent to dissolve the
corporation and the taking of some steps to that end, in
our opinion did not ipso facto either destroy the existence
of the corporation as a taxable entity or permit the
petitioner to appropriate as his own income which would
123
otherwise
be
taxable
to
the
corporation.
Thus, while Meloso earned income during the fall of 1943, the
court nevertheless held that the formal liquidation of the
corporation on December 31, 1943 would be ignored for federal
income tax purposes and Mr. Snively would be instead treated as
124
directly purchasing assets.
The court stated that the income
115. 19 T.C. 850 (1953).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 851.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 852.
120. Id. at 853.
121. Id. at 850.
122. Id. at 858.
123. Id.
124. Id. Mr. Snively reported taxable gain with respect to the liquidation of
Meloso on his 1943 return. In the ensuing litigation, he claimed that position was
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earned by Meloso during the fall of 1943 should be reported on
125
Meloso’s return.
Originally, Mr. Snively reported long-term capital gain upon
126
the liquidation of Meloso.
Before the court, he argued this
treatment was in error and the stock purchase and liquidation
127
should be “taken as a single transaction,” citing Ashland Oil &
128
129
Refining Co.
The Tax Court found this assertion “well taken,”
noting that in Ashland Oil & Refining Co. “no taxable gain was
130
realized on the liquidation.”
3. Suter
131

Estate of Suter v. Commissioner is another case applying the KD
Doctrine to individuals who had reported short-term capital gain
on their individual returns with respect to the liquidation of a
132
recently acquired target corporation named Rondout.
In Suter,
three individuals desired to purchase a paper mill that operated in
133
The seller, advised by tax attorneys, refused
corporate solution.
to allow the corporation to sell the assets directly but agreed to sell
134
the stock.
Approximately a month after the purchasers received
135
the stock, they voted to sell Rondout, thus causing its liquidation.
Within a few days of the formal liquidation of Rondout, a new
136
corporation with the same name was formed (“New” Rondout).
New Rondout was initially capitalized with relatively small
amounts of cash contributed by each of the individuals in exchange
137
for stock of New Rondout.
These individuals then “sold” the
assets they had received in liquidation of “Old” Rondout to New
138
Consideration for the latter consisted primarily of the
Rondout.
th
in error. Id. at 859 (citing Comm’r v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6 Cir.
1938)).
125. Id. at 859.
126. Id. at 856.
127. Id. at 859.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
129. Snively, 19 T.C. at 859.
130. Id.
131. 29 T.C. 244 (1957), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 8.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 247.
134. Id. at 247-48.
135. Id. at 250.
136. Id. at 251.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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assumption by New Rondout of the purchase money indebtedness
issued by the individuals in their purchase of the Old Rondout
stock.
The Service asserted that the transaction was a tax-free
reorganization and that the individual purchasers received a
dividend to the extent of current and accumulated earnings and
profits of the old target corporation and the new target
139
corporation.
The Service argued that the new corporation thus
had a carryover basis in the assets acquired from the old target
corporation.
The Tax Court disagreed with the reorganization assertion,
since the shareholders of New Rondout were not the same
shareholders as those of Old Rondout, and found that the new
target corporation took a basis of $500,000 in the assets it received
by way of the individual purchasers, which was the price they had
140
paid for the stock.
Interestingly, the Tax Court viewed New
Rondout as the purchaser of the assets of Old Rondout.
4. Mattison
The Service successfully invoked the KD Doctrine in United
141
States v. Mattison.
Here, Continental Oil Company negotiated to
buy Westcott Oil Company, but the negotiations were not
142
Mr.
consummated because of a disagreement over price.
Mattison, a Westcott shareholder, then obtained an offer from
143
Continental to buy the operating assets of Westcott.
Mattison
purchased the remainder of the stock in Westcott and caused the
corporation to distribute its operating assets in partial liquidation,
which he reconveyed to a subsidiary of Continental, in exchange
144
Mattison received the remaining assets within the next
for cash.
year and reported capital gains totaling approximately $123,000
145
with respect to both taxable years as a result of the liquidation.
The Service appealed from a district court ruling that
146
On appeal, the Service asserted the
respected the liquidation.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 258-60.
th
United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9 Cir. 1959).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Mattison v. United States, 163 F.Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1958).
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KD Doctrine, arguing that Mattison had purchased the assets from
147
Westcott which he subsequently sold to Continental. The Service
asserted that the lump sum purchase price should be allocated
across all of the assets and that the cash should have a basis equal to
148
its value.
Viewed this way, certain non-liquid assets had a lower
basis in Mattison’s hands, resulting in a greater taxable gain to
Mattison upon the subsequent asset sale to Continental than was
treated as gain realized in liquidation.
The Ninth Circuit, noting the liquidation treatment used by
Mattison, stated:
There is, however, an established exception to the rule
giving effect to liquidating distributions, which is known
as the Kimbell-Diamond rule. Under this doctrine, when a
taxpayer who is interested primarily in a corporation’s
assets first purchases the stock and then liquidates the
corporation in order to acquire the desired assets, the
separate steps taken to accomplish the primary objective
149
will
be
treated
as
a
single
transaction.
The appellate court thus agreed with the Service that the KD
Doctrine applied and that Mattison should be treated as having
purchased the assets from Westcott, with no significance given to
150
the formal liquidation of Westcott.
5. Griswold
151

In Griswold v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit decided the KD
Doctrine’s applicability to a case involving two individual
purchasers, who, upon advice of their accountant, sought to obtain
a stepped-up basis in the assets of a target corporation by
152
invocation of the KD Doctrine.
The individual purchasers,
majority shareholders in cigarette vending machine companies,
acquired the stock of Independent Cigarette Service, Inc.
(“Independent”) for cash and notes, as the sellers of Independent
153
would not sell the assets directly. The notes were put into escrow,

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 757.
United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 18.
Griswold v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id.
Id. at 431.
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154

along with the stock of Independent as collateral.
However,
under the terms of the purchase agreement, the corporate
155
existence of Independent was to be maintained at all times.
Although Independent was actually liquidated about nine months
after the purchase, the government claimed that the KD Doctrine
did not apply because the purchase agreement itself expressly
156
provided that Independent was to retain its corporate identity.
157
The Tax Court agreed with this argument.
158
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concurred.
It rejected the
taxpayers’ argument that they had instructed their attorney, when
he was drafting the purchase agreement, that they wished to
liquidate the corporation, and that the court should thus recognize
159
the “intent” of the taxpayers.
The appellate court stated that
while evidence of a single, integrated transaction may be shown
from circumstances other than formal agreements, it did not
160
believe the contents of such agreements could simply be ignored.
Accordingly, it accepted the Tax Court’s finding that the taxpayers
did not engage in or consummate a single, integrated transaction
161
to acquire the assets of Independent.
Since the assets were
reincorporated into a new corporation, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the overall transaction was a tax-free reorganization under
162
section 368(a)(1)(D) and (F).
6. Other Rulings
The KD Doctrine became commonplace, even with regard to
non-corporate purchasers. Thus, in Fox & Hounds, Inc. v.
163
Commissioner, there was no dispute that the KD Doctrine applied,
where individual purchasers acquired all of the stock of a target
corporation and then promptly liquidated the corporation, with

154. Id. at 428.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 435.
157. Griswold v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 463, 473-74 (1966).
158. Griswold, 400 F.2d at 431-32.
159. Id. at 432.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. See generally Brian B. Gibney, Liquidation-Reincorporation and Fictional
Stock in Related Corporation Asset Transfers, 81 J. TAX’N 144 (1994) (discussing
various tax consequences that attend the liquidation of a subsidiary and
reincorporation of the assets into a newly-formed corporation).
163. Fox & Hounds, Inc. v. Comm’r, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1216 (1962).
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their intent evidenced in the purchase agreement.
The issue in
Fox & Hounds went simply to the allocation of costs (basis) and
whether the purchasers were required to shift the allocation of the
purchase price from depreciable assets to goodwill, for which no
165
amortization deductions were generally available at that time. In
addition, while other courts wrestled with whether the corporate
KD Doctrine had been completely preempted by 1954 Code
section 334(b)(2), there was very little, if any, debate about the
166
viability of the non-corporate KD Doctrine.
Nevertheless, the
courts continued to insist upon the requisite elements: as in
Griswold, the individual purchasers must acquire their target
corporation stock for the sole purpose of liquidating the target
167
corporation in order to reach its assets.
The non-corporate KD Doctrine was to be found in rulings
168
the
from the Service, as well. In Revenue Ruling 69-242,
individual taxpayer, as a result of a public condemnation of his real
estate, desired to acquire certain other real estate to qualify for a
169
tax-free exchange under the rule of then-existing section 1033.
The desired property was an asset of a corporation. While the
corporation would not sell the asset directly to the taxpayer, it did
offer to sell its stock. Pursuant to a prearranged plan, the taxpayer
purchased the stock and promptly liquidated the corporation. If
the taxpayer were treated as purchasing stock, he would recognize
a certain amount of gain under section 1033; however, if the
taxpayer were treated as purchasing assets, he would recognize no
gain. Citing Suter and Cullen, the ruling notes that:
164. Id.
165. Id. Cf. I.R.C. § 197 (CCH 2001) (providing a fifteen-year amortization
period for goodwill and enacted in 1993). Statements of the pre-section 197 status
of goodwill still exist in regulations. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (2000) (“No
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.”).
166. See, e.g., Am. Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl.
1968) (“The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, without question, remains viable for
individual taxpayers because section 334(b)(2) is applicable only to corporate
taxpayers.”).
167. See Lang v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 874 (1982) (holding that KD
Doctrine did not give individuals (or the newly formed corporation) an asset basis
step-up, where target corporation was not liquidated until nearly three years after
its purchase by individuals, followed by the prompt reincorporation of the assets
into a newly formed corporation; tax-free reorganization rules applied).
168. Rev. Rul. 69-242, 1969-1 C.B. 200.
169. Id.
Section 1033 still generally provides tax-free treatment for
condemned property that is exchanged for qualified replacement property. I.R.C.
§ 1033 (2001).
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In cases involving individuals who have acquired the stock
of a corporation and then liquidated the newly acquired
corporation pursuant to a prearranged plan, it has been
held that no gain or loss was recognized on such
liquidations on the theory that the transaction is in
170
essence an acquisition of assets.
The Service concluded that the taxpayer purchased the assets
since his purpose in acquiring the corporation’s stock was to
acquire its assets directly. No mention was made about the
171
application of recapture provisions such as sections 1245 or 1250.
Private rulings of the Service also affirmed the relevance of the
172
non-corporate KD Doctrine. In one such ruling, the Service
ruled that the purchase by a partnership (“Partnership I”) of the
stock of another corporation (“Corp I”), followed by the transfer of
such stock to another partnership (“Partnership VII”) would be
treated as the purchase of assets of the corporation followed by the
transfer of such assets to Partnership VII. In its ruling, the Service
noted that “sufficient facts have been submitted which indicate that
Partnership I intended to liquidate Corp I at the time of the stock
purchase so as to acquire thereby the underlying assets of Corp
173
I.” Thus, the ruling explicitly ignores the transfer by Partnership
I of its stock interest in Corp I “because of the absence of any
174
evident business purpose motivating such transfer.”
However,
from the seller’s side, the Service stated that sale of the Corp I stock
175
“will nevertheless be respected as such.”
176
In another ruling issued about a year later, the Service ruled
that the purchase of all of the stock of Target corporation followed
by its planned merger into the Purchaser would be treated as a
purchase of Target’s assets, where the Purchaser was an “S”
170. Rev. Rul. 69-242, 1969-1 C.B. 200, 201 (citing Estate of Suter v. Comm’r,
29 T.C. 244 (1957); Cullen v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 368 (1950)).
171. In this regard, the revenue ruling is similar to a private ruling issued in
1966, which reached a similar conclusion regarding the treatment of the stock
acquisition and liquidation as an asset purchase for section 1033 purposes. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6610205770A (Oct. 20, 1966) (expressing no opinion as to the
applicability of section 1250).
172. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056 (Jan. 28, 1987). Although private letter rulings
do not carry precedential status, they nonetheless reflect the Service’s reasoning
on a particular fact situation. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (CCH 2001).
173. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056 (Jan. 28, 1987).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-18-049 (May 6, 1988) revoked by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-23-024
(June 11, 1993).
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corporation and was treated as an individual, and thus ineligible to
177
The ruling
make a qualified stock purchase under section 338.
178
cites Revenue Ruling 69-242 for this proposition.
In this private
ruling, the Service also ruled that the shareholders of Target would
be treated as having sold their shares of Target stock to Purchaser
and will recognize gain or loss accordingly under section 1001.
The Service ruled no gain or loss would be recognized by Target
179
under section 336 because of the deemed asset sale. It should be
noted that this ruling was revoked in 1993, with no rationale given
180
other than the earlier ruling “was in error.”
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE NON-CORPORATE KD DOCTRINE
A. Scope of the Doctrine
As illustrated above, the corporate KD Doctrine has been
181
largely preempted by section 338.
The non-corporate KD
177. During the years at issue, section 1371 provided that for “purposes of
Subchapter C, an S corporation in its capacity as a shareholder of another
corporation shall be treated as an individual.” I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2) (prior to repeal
by Pub. L. No. 104-188, Aug. 20, 1996). Later rulings, however, allowed an S
corporation to make a section 338 election. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (Jul.
28, 1992).
178. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-18-049, supra note 176. The ruling also cites In re Chrome
Plate, 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980).
179. However, this arose in a pre-General Utilities repeal context. See infra notes
199-205 and accompanying text.
180. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-23-024 (June 11, 1993). One interpretation is that the
Service simply changed its mind regarding the ability of an S corporation to make
a qualified stock purchase. This was the position explicitly adopted in Technical
Advice Memorandum 92-45-004 (S corporation can make a qualified stock
purchase and an election under I.R.C. § 338). Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (Nov. 6,
1992). See MARTIN GINSBURG & JACK LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & BUYOUTS ¶
1105.6.1 at 11-108 (June 2001 ed.) [hereinafter GINSBURG & LEVIN] (stating the
Service’s initial determination in Private Letter Ruling 88-18-049 was “wildly
wrong”).
181. However, this is not to suggest that no vestiges of the KD Doctrine remain
for corporate purchasers. On one hand, and somewhat ironically, the KD
Doctrine remains vibrant in the tax-free reorganization context. See Rev. Rul. 67274, 1967-2 C.B. 141 (describing acquisition of all of the stock of a target
corporation in exchange for acquiring corporation voting stock, followed by a
prompt liquidation of the target, treated as a unitary stock-for-assets acquisition by
the acquiring corporation and a tax-free reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(C)). The Service subsequently explained, in Revenue Ruling 74-35,
that, although Revenue Ruling 67-274 “makes no reference to Kimbell-Diamond, the
holding that the initial acquisition of stock is to be disregarded as transitory and
that the transaction is to be treated as an acquisition of assets represents an

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/8

28

Bakke: Dusting off Kimbell-Diamond: The Continued Viability of the Asset
04_BAKKE

2002]

4/18/2002 5:00 PM

DUSTING OFF KIMBALL-DIAMOND DOCTRINE

1471

Doctrine, in contrast, has not been specifically preempted, and
presumably remains a viable doctrine. However, as discussed
below, depending upon the scope of the non-corporate KD
Doctrine, certain factors may mitigate the practical effect of its
viability.
One of the critical inquiries in assessing the practical effect of
the continued viability of the non-corporate KD Doctrine is the
extent to which the doctrine ignores or respects the liquidation
event. On one hand, there are cases, such as Pittsburgh Realty
Investment Trust, that suggest a more limited view of the doctrine’s
effect, in that it applies to ignore the liquidation for basis step-up
purposes only, but that the liquidation event retains independent
significance for other purposes (such as transferee liability, as in
182
Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust).
However, one must keep in mind that while former section
334(b)(2) was meant to effectuate the “principles” of Kimbell183
Diamond, it was not simply a wholesale codification of the KD
Doctrine. Thus, rather than suggesting a narrow view of the KD
Doctrine (one in which the unitary asset transaction exists for basis
purposes only), the court in Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust might
be viewed as simply construing former section 334(b)(2), which
always operated within the context of a corporate liquidation and
by its terms required recapture and not the KD Doctrine as such
(or at least the non-corporate KD Doctrine). If however, the
application of the Kimbell-Diamond principle.” Rev. Rul. 74-35, 1974-1 C.B. 85.
“Under that principle, whenever a corporation acquires all the stock of another
corporation pursuant to a prearranged plan to liquidate that corporation in order
to acquire its assets, the transaction is treated, as to the acquiring corporation, as
an acquisition of assets.” Id.
Consider also the situation where a corporation purchases for cash a large amount
of stock (say, seventy percent) of a target corporation with the intent to acquire
seventy percent of its assets. If the purchase does not constitute a qualified stock
purchase within the meaning of section 338(d)(3) (and does not constitute a
section 368 reorganization), could the purchasing corporation invoke the KD
doctrine to treat its acquisition of the target corporation assets pursuant to a
prompt liquidation of target as a direct purchase of the assets? See, e.g., Tech. Adv.
Mem. 97-42-039 (Apr. 2, 1997) (explaining acquisition of target stock does not
qualify for “purchase” treatment under section 338(h)(3) and apparently is not
acquired in a tax-free reorganization either); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-04-025
(Oct. 29, 1999) (describing that the acquisition of less than all of the stock of a
target corporation, followed by its dissolution in which the acquiring corporation
did not acquire all of the target’s assets, will be treated as a direct transfer of assets
that qualifies as a tax-free reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(D)).
182. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust view applies to the KD Doctrine
generally (including the non-corporate KD Doctrine) then its
continued viability may not have any more practical effect than
following the current statutory regime governing liquidations. This
is because, under the current liquidation provisions, property
received by a non-corporate shareholder in a distribution in
complete liquidation in which gain or loss is recognized takes as its
basis the fair market value of the property at the time of the
184
distribution.
This limited view of the doctrine (in which the liquidation
event is respected for other purposes) may be seen in rulings from
the Service. For example, in relatively recent private rulings, the
Service has ruled that a two-step acquisition following the KimbellDiamond model may be viewed as a direct asset acquisition. In one
185
ruling, an acquiring corporation acquired all of the stock of a
target corporation through a tax-free reverse triangular merger
under section 368(a)(2)(E) (“Acquisition Merger,”) although “it
was desired to have the businesses of the two corporation [sic]
186
operated in a single corporation.”
For various reasons, it could
187
When these
not acquire the target corporation assets directly.
impediments are removed, however, it proposes to merge the
target corporation “upstream” into the acquiring corporation
(“Upstream Merger”), much as described in Revenue Ruling 200146. The Service rules that this two-step acquisition will be treated as
though the acquiring corporation acquired the target assets
directly, citing Revenue Ruling 67-274.
In addition, the Service also ruled that, for the period between
the Acquisition Merger and the Upstream Merger, the target
corporation “will be treated for tax purposes as remaining in
existence” and will accordingly be included in the acquiring
corporation’s consolidated return until the end of the date of the
188
Upstream Merger.
Such a ruling affirms the principle that the
184. I.R.C. § 334(a) (CCH 2001).
185. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-15-013 (Apr. 16, 1999).
186. Id.
187. Such reasons often involve complications with the assignability of valuable
target corporation contacts, for example.
188. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-15-013 (Apr. 6, 1999) (holdings 1, 4); see also Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 98-40-004 (Oct. 2, 1998) (similar). These rulings reflect a reversal of an
earlier position of the Service, in that the target corporation did not become a
member of the acquiring corporation’s consolidated group during the period
preceding the liquidation. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-37-003 (Sept. 16, 1988); see also
ANDREW J. DUBROFF ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS FILING
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separate existence of a corporation, apart from its shareholders, is
189
generally unquestioned and forms the premise for the corporate
190
liquidation provisions of the tax code.
On the other hand, there is a line of cases, such as Mattison,
that clearly state from the purchaser’s perspective the formal
liquidation event is not a taxable event for federal income tax
191
purposes and the purchaser is simply treated as acquiring assets
192
Revenue Ruling 69-242 might
directly from an unrelated seller.
also be viewed as illustrative of this broader application of the KD
Doctrine, in which the liquidation event is simply ignored. Recall
that no mention was made of depreciation recapture in that ruling
and the ruling held that the substance of the transaction was that
the relevant property was directly acquired for federal income tax
purposes.
As the example in the beginning of this Article illustrates, to
the extent the non-corporate KD Doctrine is viewed in this broader
fashion, it would have a significant practical effect, particularly
where the aggregate basis of the assets “inside” the acquired target
corporation is relatively low compared to the fair market value of
the assets.
B. Factors Affecting Viability
193

It is clear that the basic corporate KD Doctrine has been
194
preempted by section 338 and the regulations thereunder.
Congress and the Service have reiterated that form controls where
an acquiring corporation acquires all of the stock of Target in a

CONSOLIDATED RETURNS § 11.03 (2d ed. Oct. 2000).
189. See Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943)
(explaining corporation generally treated as a separate taxable entity, although it
may be disregarded when its formation or existence is a sham).
190. See generally I.R.C. §§ 331-337 (CCH 2001).
191. See United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13, 22 n.11 (9th Cir. 1959).
192. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-1(a)(1) (2001) (describing that as a consequence
of a section 338 election, a “new” target corporation is treated as acquiring all of
its assets from an unrelated person).
193. “Basic” should be read to be synonymous with qualified stock purchase;
i.e., the application of the KD Doctrine in a situation where a corporation has
engaged in a qualified stock purchase within the meaning of I.R.C. section
338(d)(3).
194. Somewhat ironically, if the actual facts of the Kimbell-Diamond case were to
arise today, the separate steps (i.e., the acquisition and the liquidation) would be
respected, as the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company originally desired. See Rev.
Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67; cf. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 1 (Sept. 25, 2001).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8
04_BAKKE

4/18/2002 5:00 PM

1474

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

qualified stock purchase and then liquidates Target; i.e., each of
two steps (the purchase and the liquidating distribution) are given
independent significance, as long as the overall transaction would
not qualify as a section 368 reorganization under the rationale of
Revenue Ruling 2001-46).
While Kimbell-Diamond generated
hundreds of citations over the course of five decades, relatively few
have been made since the 1980s, a phenomenon that is in accord
with all the congressional and judicial announcements of its
preemption and extinction.
But what does the dearth of citations say of the con-corporate
195
KD Doctrine? Does it suggest that it is extinct as well? When the
Fifth Circuit in Chrome Plate spoke of the extinction of the KD
196
Doctrine, it was speaking with regard to “corporate taxpayers.”
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Court of Claims was
troubled, in American Potash, by the fact that Congress would
preempt the KD Doctrine in enacting section 334(b)(2) of the
1954 Code, but leave it available for individual or non-corporate
197
taxpayers.
It stated that “Congress either ignored or chose to
exclude the individual taxpayers, but we may not assume from
either alternative that this court thus has the right to equalize the
situation.
Congress has specifically provided for corporate
198
taxpayers, and we are bound by that legislation.” What follows is a
brief discussion of factors affecting the continued viability of the
KD Doctrine to non-corporate purchasers.
1. Repeal of General Utilities
Probably the most significant development in corporate
income tax law since the observation made by the Chrome Plate
199
court has been the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, which
represents the biggest cloud over the continued viability of the
Non-corporate KD Doctrine. Under the General Utilities doctrine,
later codified in section 311 of the 1954 Code, corporations were
generally able to make distributions of appreciated property to
their shareholders without the recognition of gain at the corporate
level, with exceptions added over time for certain recapture items.
195. See In re Chrome Plate, 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980)
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. So named for the holding in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering.
296 U.S. 200 (1935).
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With the repeal of this doctrine, as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Congress generally endorsed a double-tax system for
distributions of appreciated property: i.e., the imposition of tax
upon gain at the corporate level upon distribution and the
imposition of tax at the shareholder level upon receipt of such
200
property.
This treatment extended not only to liquidations, but
201
to ordinary dividend distributions, too.
The repeal of General Utilities may be thought to have also
repealed the KD Doctrine. Generally, when the KD Doctrine was
applied, the target corporation’s distribution of property in
202
Thus, if the KD Doctrine
liquidation was effectively ignored.
remains viable, it presents a way of avoiding corporate-level
203
taxation.
Significantly, there has not been a reported case involving the
non-corporate KD Doctrine since the repeal of General Utilities.
This may well reflect an implicit recognition that the operating
assumptions existing when cases such as Suter, Snively, and Cullen
arose do not exist anymore, bringing the validity of such cases into

200. See I.R.C. § 301 (CCH 2001); cf. I.R.C. § 355 (CCH 2001) (providing a
mechanism for a corporation to spin off a controlled subsidiary with no corporate
or shareholder level gain recognition). See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note
16, ¶ 8.20 (discussing the General Utilities doctrine and its repeal).
201. See I.R.C. § 311(b); I.R.C. § 336 (CCH 2001). Congress retained the
model by which liquidating distributions to a parent corporation shareholder that
held at least eighty percent of the liquidating corporation’s stock would continue
to generally be a nonrecognition event. See I.R.C. §§ 332(a), 334(b), 337(a) (CCH
2001).
202. See, e.g., Robert Willens, Recent IRS Rulings Give ‘Kimbell-Diamond’ Doctrine
Continuing Vitality, 2001 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) 202, J-1 (Oct. 22, 2001) (describing
that, while the KD Doctrine may continue to be viable, in light of General Utilities
repeal, the acquisition of target corporation assets “is certainly taxable”); David S.
Miller, The Devolution and Inevitable Extinction of the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 3
FLA. TAX REV. 187, 234 (1996) (describing that after “repeal of General Utilities, an
acquiror cannot make a qualified stock purchase, decline to make a section 338
election, merge the target into acquiror’s wholly-owned subsidiary, and simply
claim a cost basis in target’s stock”); Benjamin G. Wells, Does the Asset Acquisition
Doctrine Apply after TRA ‘86?, 69 J. TAX’N 386, 389 (1988) (explaining “[t]he repeal
of the General Utilities [doctrine] for corporate liquidations represents a
determination that there should be no step-up in the basis of [target corporation]
assets without recognition of a corporate level tax”); cf. GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra
note 180, ¶ 208.3 at 2-225 (discussing implications of Private Letter Ruling 88-18049, authors suggest that KD Doctrine still lives, particularly the non-corporate KD
Doctrine).
203. See supra Part I.A. (describing a transaction that involves only a single
level of taxation: i.e., upon the shareholders of Target if their stock in Target is
appreciated). See generally I.R.C. § 1001 (West 2001).
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question. Before the repeal of General Utilities, a liquidating
corporation generally did not recognize gain or loss upon the
distribution of property in complete liquidation, except for LIFO
204
recapture amounts.
Presumably, this is the reason that the
Service has not issued rulings in this area. It may also explain why
one of the last rulings to apply the non-corporate KD Doctrine was
within the transition period provided by the Tax Reform Act of
1986, in which liquidating distributions could continue to be made
205
without corporate-level taxation.
2. Lack of Explicit Repeal
The strongest counter-argument to the notion that the noncorporate KD Doctrine has been repealed through the repeal of
General Utilities is the fact that it has not been explicitly repealed.
Simply put, Suter, Snively, Cullen, and others like them, have not
been overruled, and the Service has not withdrawn its published
acquiescence to these decisions. In addition, Revenue Ruling 69242 has not been modified or revoked.
Moreover, the Service, even after the repeal of General Utilities,
seems to acknowledge that the non-corporate KD Doctrine might
be available. On this point, the discussion by the Service in a 1992
206
technical advice memorandum is telling.
The primary issue
207
discussed therein was whether an S corporation should be treated
as a corporation when it acquires the stock of a target corporation
208
and promptly liquidates the target.
If the purchaser in this
context is not treated as a corporation, then the S corporation
209
shareholders (typically, individuals) are treated as the purchasers.
The Service discussed the KD Doctrine, former section 334(b)(2),
the enactment of section 338, and the enactment in 1982 of a
provision that provided an S corporation in its capacity as a
shareholder of another corporation is treated as an individual, for

204. See I.R.C. § 336 (West 1954).
205. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056 (Jan. 28, 1987) (conditioning ruling on the
liquidation of Corp I occurring before January 1, 1987, lest such delay would cause
corporate-level gain or loss to be recognized); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2085 at § 631(a) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 336 (2001)).
206. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (July 28, 1992).
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text.
209. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004, supra note 206.
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210

purposes of subchapter C of the Code. Noting that this provision
was enacted less than two months after the enactment of section
338, the Service stated that “[w]e do not believe that Congress
intended to return S corporations to the law as it existed before the
1954 Code, when it was necessary to ascertain the intent of the
acquiring corporation at the time of the stock purchase in order to
determine whether the transaction would be treated as an asset
211
purchase.”
Thus, although the Service concludes that an S corporation
should be treated as a corporation (and thus subject to section 338
and regulations underlying) it implicitly acknowledged that the
non-corporate KD Doctrine remains viable. However, the Service
also determined that such a conclusion would not “give rise to
abuse under today’s federal tax system, such as the avoidance of
General Utilities gain,” since any built-in gain in the target
corporation assets would carry over to the acquiring corporation
212
under section 332 and 334.
Because of the repeal of General
Utilities, it is likely that the Service would come to a different
conclusion under different facts (involving a non-corporate
purchaser) if gain is avoided altogether through invocation of the
non-corporate KD Doctrine.
The fundamental fact remains that the legislative history of
213
section 338 and the pronouncement of the Chrome Plate court,
which involve explicit declarations of the revocation of the KD
Doctrine, involved contexts of traditional application: where a
corporate purchaser acquires all of the stock of a target corporation
214
and promptly liquidates the target.
No discussion exists in the
section 338 legislative history regarding non-corporate purchasers
because section 338 by definition, was limited to corporate
purchasers and the application of the KD Doctrine to individuals
215
and other non-corporate purchasers was never codified.
In
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 2.
214. I.R.C. § 338(d)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(b)(1) (2001).
215. Moreover, under the “reenactment doctrine,” Congress’s reenactment
without significant change of a statutory provision that has been the subject of
judicial construction might be viewed as giving legislative imprimatur to such
interpretation. See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924) (stating that when
“adopting the language used in an earlier act, Congress [is] considered to have
adopted [the same language adopted by the court], and to have made it part of
the enactment”).
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addition, while federal income tax law is intensely statutory, it is
216
also informed by a rich history of non-statutory principles.
Therefore, its judicial interpretations are not exempt from stare
217
decisis.
Finally, significant administrative materials are on record as
endorsing the non-corporate KD Doctrine. Chief among these
materials is Revenue Ruling 69-242, in which the Service affirmed
the notion that no gain or loss would be recognized upon the
liquidation of the acquired corporation where such corporation
was acquired with a view toward obtaining its assets as qualified
replacement property. Although Revenue Ruling 69-242 addressed
the application of the non-corporate KD Doctrine in the context of
section 1033, the ruling nevertheless clearly holds that the
218
purchaser is treated as purchasing assets, and not stock.
In this sense, Revenue Ruling 69-242 resembles KimbellDiamond itself, which involved the purchaser’s basis in qualified
replacement property under the predecessor to section 1033.
Moreover, Congress granted the Service and Treasury rulemaking
authority “as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the
purposes” of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, including regulations “to
ensure that such purposes may not be circumvented through the
219
use of any provision of law or regulations . . . .”
Presumably,
Treasury and the Service have the authority to issue regulations
that would deny invocation of the non-corporate KD Doctrine in
220
order to avoid corporate-level taxation under section 336.
To
date, however, no regulations have been proposed or finalized.
3. Lack of a Complete Model; Whipsaw
The KD Doctrine is not a complete model. One of its more
troubling aspects is that it does not adequately explain what
216. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (showing the
classic substance-over-form case often cited for the proposition that how a
transaction is viewed for tax purposes does not depend simply upon the literal
compliance with the text of a statute, but must be informed by the underlying
purposes of the law as well).
217. See generally, Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies
Grow up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 520-54 (1994) (arguing that tax law
practitioners would be better served by not viewing tax law as wholly different from
other non-tax law).
218. Id.
219. I.R.C. § 337(d) (CCH 2001).
220. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-4 (1998) (requiring gain recognition upon
the conversion of a taxable entity to a tax-exempt entity).
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happens to the selling shareholders. When a purchaser invokes the
KD Doctrine, and asserts that its acquisition is actually a direct asset
purchase for federal income tax purposes, the seller is almost
certainly treating the “other side” of the transaction as a sale of
corporate stock. Purists are left to ask: “What happened to the
target corporation? How (and when) did it simply disappear?”
This is not an insignificant concern for a system that places a great
221
premium upon internal symmetry and consistency.
Thus, if the
effect of the continued application of the non-corporate Doctrine
is that, as in Snively, the liquidation exchange between the
shareholder and the corporation is not a taxable exchange, and
from the seller’s perspective the transaction is viewed simply as a
stock sale, then the non-corporate KD Doctrine presents significant
dissymmetry.
This inconsistent treatment of both sides of the same
transaction presents “whipsaw” concerns, in that both sides of a
transaction are not treating it the same way. Generally, the
administration of the federal income tax system requires consistent
treatment by parties to the transaction to avoid “whipsaw,” where
parties might claim inconsistent characterizations, each to their
respective advantage. This is, in some respects, a variation of the
General Utilities-repeal concern expressed above: if a seller is able to
treat a transaction as a stock sale and the buyer is able to treat the
same transaction as an asset purchase, what happens to the
corporation in the meantime? In the “post-General Utilities repeal
world, a corporate liquidation is not a transaction step that can be
222
glossed over.”
Troubling as these issues might be for those desiring a
223
complete model, they are not new. Such inconsistencies may be
found in the original application of the KD Doctrine. For example,
224
in Dallas Downtown Development Co. v. Commissioner,
the
government pursued the sellers of a target corporation that was
acquired and liquidated under the theory that the corporation had

221. See Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (stating
“the [Internal Revenue] Code must be given ‘as great an internal symmetry and
consistency as its words permit.’”) (quoting Comm’r v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304
(1961)).
222. GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 180, ¶ 208.3 at 2-226.
223. See id. ¶ 608.4 at 6-108 (discussing instances in which both parties do not
treat the transaction the same way for tax purposes).
224. Dallas Downtown Dev. Co. v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 114 (1949).
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225

sold assets when they had in fact sold stock.
The Tax Court
disagreed and found the selling shareholders had engaged in a
226
stock sale.
Moreover, the Service has issued rulings that do not present a
complete model in a somewhat similar factual setting. For
227
example, in Revenue Ruling 99-6, the Service describes the
federal income tax consequences that arise when a partner in a
partnership sells his or her half interest in the partnership to the
remaining partner who owns the other half of the partnership, thus
causing a termination of the partnership under section
228
The Service ruled that the selling partner is
708(b)(1)(A).
treated as though he or she sold his or her partnership interest, i.e.,
229
the tax consequences follow the form.
Because of this
termination, the partnership is treated as liquidating, distributing
230
all of its assets to the purchasing partner.
With little explanation, however, the Service then proffers that
the purchasing partner is treated as though he bought assets,
taking a cost basis under section 1012 in the one half of the
231
partnership’s assets attributable to the selling partner. The buyer
is also precluded from tacking on the holding period for which
232
Here, the Service
those assets were held by the partnership.
states that section 735(b), which normally allows tacking of the
holding period of property received in a distribution from a
partnership, “does not apply with respect to the assets that [buyer]
233
is deemed to have purchased from [seller].” In other words, the
liquidating distribution normally made by a partnership in a
technical termination of the partnership is ignored.

225. Id. at 123.
226. Id. at 123-25. See also Tel. Answering Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 423,
432 (1974), aff’d, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding that I.R.C. § 337 required
recognition of the gain realized on a sale); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Comm’r, 20
T.C. 198, 200 (1953) (concluding that tax consequences are determined by the
purpose for which petitioner paid for stock).
227. Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-6 I.R.B. 6.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056, supra note 205 (describing asset purchase
on buyer side, stock sale on seller side).
232. Rev. Rul. 99-6, supra note 227.
233. Id.
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4. Taxpayer’s Ability to Assert “Substance”
Any taxpayer concluding that form does not govern (and that
the stock transaction should actually be treated as an asset sale)
should be cognizant of a tendency in the tax law by which taxpayers
are “stuck” with the form they choose, even though the
government may have the prerogative to assert “substance over
234
However, while ordinarily a taxpayer must live with the
form.”
chosen form, where there is substantial authority in the form of
case law and Service rulings that treat certain transactions in a
manner different than their form, the established law and rulings
prevail over “form” treatment.
For example, in the context of sale versus lease treatment, “the
principal Service ruling on the . . . issue establishes standards that
can evidently be invoked by taxpayers to establish that a purported
235
lease is a sale.” And revenue rulings, such as Revenue Ruling 69242 and Revenue Ruling 67-274, are published with the knowledge
and expectation that taxpayers will be relying upon them “in
determining the tax treatment of their own transactions” and to
avoid the need to “request specific rulings applying the principles
of a published revenue ruling to the facts of their particular
236
cases.”
With this endorsement of the application of the step
transaction doctrine to a two-step acquisition, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine lives with respect to
non-corporate purchasers, and may be invoked in those situations
where it historically has been available.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the non-corporate KD Doctrine remains viable, the
practical effect of its viability is shrouded in ambiguity. There are
considerable tax policy reasons why taxpayers should not be able to
circumvent corporate-level taxation, especially where similarly
situated taxpayers, i.e., corporate purchasers are unable to do so
234. See, e.g., Nestle Holdings v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing
Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974)
(holding “‘taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, [but] once having
done so, . . . he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether
contemplated or not.’”)).
235. BORIS I. BITTKER AND LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶4.4.6 (2d ed. 1999 supp.) (citing Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B.
39).
236. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, § 7.01(5).
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without inheriting a tax liability. But taxpayers are not always so
circumspect about tax policy when a substantial body of law
(unamended by legislative, judicial, or administrative action) gives
apparent imprimatur to treating a two-step acquisition as a direct
purchase. Thus, the government should not be surprised if noncorporate taxpayers invoke the KD Doctrine in circumstances
where it historically has been applied. And taxpayers should not be
surprised if the government asserts that form controls and that the
taxpayer must live with the federal income tax consequences that
attend a corporate liquidation event.
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